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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SYMPOSIUM: THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN ILLINOIS
PRIVATE NUISANCES
This section of the three-part symposium will present a discussion of
the law of private nuisances in Illinois. There will be a definition of the
term, pointing out the confusion which is involved with the use of the word
"nuisance." From there will follow a discussion of the historical develop-
ment of private nuisances in this state and of the recent Illinois cases in the
area of private nuisances. A discussion of the effect which zoning regulations
have on common law private nuisances will be denoted. The conclusion will
delve into possible new areas where the common law of private nuisance
may expand.
PRIVATE NUISANCE DEFINED
The Restatement of the Law of Torts,1 in its introduction to the law
of private nuisances, states that the term "nuisance" is used in several senses.
While it should be avoided even in a discussion directed to the legal profes-
sion, nevertheless, the term is constantly used by the courts, though it seems
to be incapable of being precisely defined.
The term nuisance is often used by the courts as a catch-word without
further consideration of the actual tort involved. Part of the reason for the
uncertainty prevalent with respect to the meaning of the word stems from
the fact that, rather than delineating a type of tortious conduct, nuisance is
a field of tort liability. The emphasis is not on any particular kind of con-
duct, but on the interests invaded.
A broad definition was used in the case of Hall v. Putney,2 wherein the
court stated: "The term 'nuisance' extends to everything that endangers
life or health, gives offense to the senses, violates the law of decency, or ob-
structs the'reasonable and comfortable use of property."s A more precise
definition, confined to a private nuisance, was given in a recent case: 4 "....
A private nuisance is an individual wrong arising from an unreasonable,
unwarrantable or unlawful use of one's property producing such material
annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort or hurt that the law will presume a
consequent damage. ' 5
The definition of private nuisance includes a classification of nuisances.
I Restatement, Torts ch. 40, Introduction (1939).
2 291 111. App. 508, 10 N.E.2d 204 (2d Dist. 1937).
3 Id. at 511, 10 N.E2d at 207.
4 Merriam v. McConnell, 31 111. App. 2d 241, 175 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist. 1961).
5 Id. at 245, 175 N.E.2d at 295.
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In the early case of Laugel v. City of Bushnell,6 the court so indicated this
in the following language:
Nuisances may thus be classified: First, those which in their
nature are nuisances per se or are so denounced by the common
law or by statute; second, those which in their nature are not nui-
sances but may become so by reason of their locality, surroundings
or the manner in which they may be conducted, managed, etc.;
third, those which in their nature may be nuisances but as to
which there may be honest differences of opinion in important
minds.7
This classification results in a distinction between nuisances per se and
nuisances in fact. A nuisance per se is an illegal act regardless of where it
takes place. 8 In the case of a nuisance in fact, it is necessary to look at the
area in which it takes place9 or the manner in which it is carried out.
Not only is a distinction drawn by the courts between nuisance per se
and nuisance in fact, some courts discuss whether a private nuisance is based
on strict liability, negligence or intent.
In Laflin-Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney,o the defendant was held liable
for a private nuisance on the basis of strict liability. The plaintiff had
sought damages for an injury to his dwelling house, resulting from an ex-
plosion of a powder magazine located upon the defendant's land. Lightning
had struck the magazine. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's judgment for the plaintiff, and said that the powder magazine,
was so situated with reference to the dwelling house of the
plaintiff, that it was liable to inflict serious injury upon her person
or her property in. case of an explosion. It was a private nuisance
and, theretore, the defendant was liable whether the powder was
carefully kept or not.1
Negligence may be the basis of a private nuisance action. In Illinois
Cent. Ry. v. Grabill,12 the defendant erected cattle pens next to the plain-
tiff's land. The court stated that the defendant was negligent since it did
not control the noise and dust which interfered with the plaintiff's enjoy-
ment of his land. Similarly, another court l3 has said: .... [P]laintiffs have
6 197 Ill. 20, 63 N.E. 1086 (1902).
7 Id. at 26, 63 N.E. at 1088.
8 People ex rel. Dyer v. Clark, 268 I1. 156, 108 N.E. 994 (1915) (a disorderly house).
9 In Bieretz v. Village of Montgomery, 67 I11. App. 2d 403, 214 N.E.2d 149 (2d Dist.
1966), the plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of
a zoning ordinance permitting funeral homes as permitted uses. The court held that
a funeral home was not a nuisance per se since it was a legitimate business, but that
a funeral home could be a nuisance in fact under particular circumstances. The court
held that the ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the police powers and therefore
valid.
10 30 Ill. App. 321 (1st Dist. 1890), aff'd, 131 111. 322, 23 N.E. 389 (1890).
11 151 Ill. 322, 325, 23 N.E. 389, 390 (1890).
12 50 Ill. 241 (1869).
13 Merriam v. McConnell, 31 II. App. 2d 241, 175 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist. 1961). See
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recovered damages, or defendants have been enjoined only where a human
agency has intervened in a negligent, careless or willful way .... ,14 to create
a nuisance.
Other cases have held that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to base his
cause of action on negligence. In these cases, the action was based on intent:
that is, the defendant, by his conduct, knew to a substantial certainty that
an invasion of another person's right would result. In other words, the
courts have held that the defendant intended to cause the interference. 15 In
Menolascino v. Superior Felt 6- Bedding Co.,16 the defendant operated a
mattress factory in Chicago and had discharged waste which rendered the
air unwholesome. The defendant contended that the plaintiff had to prove
negligence to recover. The court stated that negligence need not be proved,
and therefore ".... contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff [is]
not in issue .... ,,17
An attempt can be made to mold the above discussion into a concrete
definition by listing the following as elements of a private nuisance:
a) a human element must cause the interference, not a natural ele-
ment; 18
b) the interference must violate a private person's right and not the
public's right;19
c) the plaintiff's interest in the enjoyment of land must be invaded by
the defendant's improper use of his land;2 0
d) the invasion need not be by a physical trespass, but must be un-
reasonable; 21
e) the invasion may be based on strict liability,22 negligence, 2 or in-
tent; 24
also, Fisher v. Pennsylvania R.R.., 263 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1959), where the court dismissed
the plaintiff's complaint because it contained no allegation of negligence.
14 Merri~m v. McConnell, supra note 13, at 244, 175 N.E.2d at 295-96.
15 See, e.g., Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co., 3 111. App. 2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (4th
Dist. 1954); Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Hunerberg, 16 111. App. 387 (1885).
16 313 Ill. App. 557, 40 N.E.2d 813 (lst Dist. 1942).
17 Id. at 567, 40 N.E.2d at 818.
18 Merriam v. McConnell, 31 111. App. 2d 241, 175 N.E.2d 293 (lst Dist. 1961).
19 "A private nuisance only violates private rights and produces damages to but
one or a few persons." 39 Am. Jur. Nuisance § 8 (1942).
20 A private nuisance "exists only where one is injured in relation to a right which
he enjoys by reason of his ownership of an interest in land." 39 Am. Jur. Nuisance § 8
(1942).
21 29 I.L.P. Nuisance §§ 8-12 (1957).
22 See Laflin-Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney, 30 Ill. App. 321 (1st Dist. 1890), afl'd,
131 I1. 322, 23 N.E. 389 (1890).
2.3 111. Cent. R.R. v. Grabill, 50 Ill. 241 (1869).
24 Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co., 3 Ill. App. 2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (4th Dist. 1954).
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f) the nuisance is usually continuous, 25 but need not be; one act which
is substantial can be called a nuisance; 26 and
g) the plaintiff must be damaged by the interference. 27
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE NUISANCES
A. Early Developments
The early cases in the area of private nuisances held that an owner of
property was entitled to the absolute use, comfort and enjoyment of his
land. No consideration was given to a defendant's interest in using his
property for a legitimate purpose. The courts merely held that he could not
use his property to interfere, in any way, with the plaintiff's enjoyment.
One of the most common and recurring factual problems, both his-
torically and presently, arises when the defendant uses his land in a manner
emitting dust, smoke and soot, thereby impairing the plaintiff's enjoyment
of his land. A study of this one line of cases can illustrate past and present
policy of the entire area of private nuisance. In Wente v. Commonwealth
Fuel Co.,28 the defendant had operated a coal hopper which emitted smoke
and dust into the plaintiff's living quarters. The court granted an injunc-
tion, although stating that the defendant's business was a necessary one.
".... [T]he court will not balance public benefits or public inconvenience
against the individual right."29 Under similar circumstances in Wylie v. El-
wood, 0 the court enjoined the defendant since the plaintiff's living quar-
ters became uncomfortable as a result of dust and dirt. It is interesting to
note that the courts issued injunctions in these situations by considering the
injury as so great as not to be adequately compensable in damages.
The key question in the early cases was whether the plaintiff suffered
any injury; not whether the defendant's use was reasonable by virtue of his
ownership of the land. In Cooper v. Randall,3 1 the court said:
The issue was whether the mill was an injury to plaintiff's
property. Even if a business be lawful in itself and is carried on
with reasonable diligence to prevent it from becoming an injury
25 Supra note 21.
26 Supra note 22. In that case, an explosion of the defendant's powder magazine was
held to be a private nuisance.
27 In Merriam v. McConnell, 31 I. App. 2d 241, 175 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist. 1961), the
court said that a private nuisance is a wrong to a private person arising from an unrea-
sonable interference with his land thereby producing such a material inconvenience or
hurt that the law will presume a consequent damage. Cf. Lindblom v. Purity Ice &
Refrigerating Co., 217 I1. App. 306 (2d Dist. 1920).
28 232 Il1. 526, 83 N.E. 1049 (1908).
29 Id. at 533, 83 N.E. at 1052.
80 134 I11. 281, 25 N.E. 570 (1890).
31 53 I11. 24 (1869). See also, Phelps v. Winch, 309 Ill. 158, 140 N.E. 847 (1923);
Schmitz v. Ort. 92 III. App. 407 (3d Dist. 1909); and O'Connor v. Aluminum Ore Co.,
224 IN. App. 613 (4th Dist. 1922).
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to others, still the proprietor will be held responsible . .. to one
who does receive injury therefrom as in rendering his dwelling
uncomfortable as a habitation. 32
Illinois case law is dotted with many cases illustrating the situations
which have been held to be a nuisance.a3
B. Recent Developments
The rule that the plaintiff had an absolute right to the enjoyment of
his land was not a workable one. It was later acknowledged that the plain-
tiff's neighbors also had rights to the use of their land and that these rights
had to be considered. The question to be decided, then, was whether the
defendant's use of his property was a "reasonable one under th-. existing
situation"? If the use was reasonable, then, although the plaintiff was in-
convenienced, he could not recover.
The principal case which established the reasonable use theory, al-
though expressed earlier,3 4 was Gardner v. International Shoe Co.35 The
plaintiffs, who resided near the defendant's shoe company, sought to recover
damages for the alleged improper conduct of the defendant's tannery and
settling basin. The defendant, by operation of a sewerage pond, had emitted
large quantities of chemicals, gases and odors, which the plaintiffs alleged
had interfered with their use and enjoyment of their homes. The lower
court granted damages to the plaintiffs. The appellate court reversed and
pointed out that, although the odors may have been offensive and disagree-
able, they were not injurious to the health of normal persons.
.... [I]t cannot be held that a nuisance exists. The term nuisance
is applied to that class of wrongs which arise from the unreason-
able . . . use by a person of his own property and produces . . .
material annoyance .... 86
After discussing many cases, the court said that these cases:
.... consider the burdens necessarily incident to life in urban and
industrial community where the air is filled with unpleasant odors
which are inevitable and unavoidable in the conduct of factories
and industries in such a district and are a necessary incident of life
therein.87
Mr. Justice Stone, in his dissent, said that if the majority opinion was
32 53 II. 24, 29 (1869).
33 See 29 I.L.P. Nuisance §§ 31-35 (1957) on particular acts, occupations and struc-
tures which may constitute a nuisance.
34 Metropolitan West Side Elevated R.R. v. Gold; 100 111. App. 323 (1st Dist. 1902).
85 319 111. App. 416, 49 N.E.2d 328 (4th Dist. 1943), afJ'd, 386 111. 418, 54 N.E.2d 482
(1944).
86 319 Ill. App. 416, 433, 49 N.E.2d 328, 334-35 (4th Dist. 1943) (Emphasis added).
The court was quoting from a Massachusetts case, Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co., 251 Mass.
479, 484, 146 N.E. 787, 790 (1925).
37 319 II1. App. 416, 433, 49 N.E.2d 328, 335 (4th Dist. 1943).
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correct, then there was such a thing as a wrong without remedy [contrary
to the Illinois Constitution]. s8
It became apparent that a policy of compromise was settled upon, and
the Illinois courts thereafter used the term "reasonable use." If the de-
fendant's use- of his land was reasonable, then the plaintiff, by necessity,
had to accept the inconvenience and annoyance. This shift of policy de-
veloped because society had become industrial and it was believed that the
public interest in the defendant's reasonable use of his land outweighed
the inconvenience the plaintiff had to face. Thus, in Ward v. Illiopolis Food
Lockers,3 9 where the defendant operated a slaughter house, the plaintiffs,
nearby residents, sought an injunction, contending that the defendant had
caused a common law nuisance since the resulting noise and odors inter-
fered with their peace and health. The appellate court reversed the lower
court's judgment for the plaintiffs and, relying on the Gardner case,40 said
that there was no showing of such an unreasonable use so as to constitute
a nuisance.
Other cases have arisen wherein cemeteries, 4' bowling alleys, 42 dance
halls, 43 and theaters44 have been held not to be an unreasonable use of
property.
The contemporary view is clearly expresed in Patterson v. Peabody
Coal Co.45 There the defendant's coal mine was situated next to the plain-
tiff's land, and it had allegedly been emitting smoke and fumes onto the
adjoining property. The court said:
The earliest cases proceeded upon the theory that an owner
of property was entitled to pure and unadultered air over his prop-
erty. As we become more industrial and less pioneering and agri-
cultural, courts were forced to recognize that industry could never
develop or even live if exceptions were not made in the original
... rules. The law thus developed that if industrial plants were
located in places suitable to their business no action for nuisance
would lie unless the interference with the use of land was substan-
tial and unreasonable or unless the defendant was causing more
interference than was necessary in the proper conduct of his busi-
ness.
46
The old rule, under which a plaintiff received unlimited enjoyment of
his land, is now balanced against the public's interest in having necessary
88 I11. Const. art. II, § 19.
39 9 Ill. App. 2d 129, 132 N.E.2d 591 (3d Dist. 1956).
40 Supra note 35.
41 Village of Villa Park v. Wanderer's Rest Cemetery Co., 316 111. 226, 147 N.E.
104 (1925).
42 Harrison v. People, 101 I11. App. 224 (lst Dist. 1902).
43 Phelps v. Winch, 309 Il1. 158, 140 N.E. 847 (1923).
44 Stevens v. Morenous, 169 Il. App. 282 (1912).
45 3 Ill. App. 2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (4th Dist. 1954).
46 Id. at 315, 122 N.E.2d at 51.
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and valuable businesses. If the defendant's use of his land is reasonable,
then there is no nuisance. In answer to Justice Stone's dissent in the Gard-
ner case 47 that everyone who suffers a wrong is entitled to a remedy, it may
be stated that where the defendant's use is reasonable, the plaintiff's annoy-
ance and injury is damnum absque injuria.
ZONING REGULATIONS AND NUISANCES
It soon became apparent in the field of private nuisance law that in-
dustry and city growth could not survive if every invasion of an individual's
property was enjoined. The law of private nuisances could not cope with
the helter-skelter development of industry within a city. The need for regu-
lated geographical areas led to zoning,4s which provided for certain per-
mitted uses in stated areas of a city.
Zoning laws, however, cannot legalize a private nuisance; that is, if
there is an industrial plant next to an individual's land which is emitting
smoke and soot and the area is zoned industrial, the zoning ordinance will
not preclude the individual from contending that the plant is a private nui-
sance. However, the zoning ordinance is one of the factors considered in de-
ciding whether a private nuisance exists. 49
When zoning regulations first- developed, courts treated nuisance law
and zoning as somewhat synonymous, in that both were interested in pro-
tecting the public welfare. For example, in City of Chicago v. Reuter Bros.
Iron Works, Inc., 50 the court said that the duty required by a zoning ordi-
nance meant that the holder of a use permit should so conduct his business
as not to commit a common law nuisance.
This view ignored the fact that zoning regulations are broader than
private nuisance law in that they follow a citywide plan and are concerned
with benefitting the whole city. The common law private nuisance concept
is only concerned with a property use which is in existence and harmful to
the plaintiff.51
The case of City of Aurora v. Burns52 noted this distinction between
nuisance and zoning:
The exclusion of places of business from residential districts is
not a declaration that such places are nuisances or that they are to
be suppressed as such, but it is a part of the general plan by which
the city's territory is allotted to different uses in order to prevent,
47 319 Ill. App. 416, 49 N.E.2d 328 (4th Dist. 1943), a/I'd, 368 111. 418, 54 N.E.2d
482 (1944).
48 Zoning describes the use which can be made of land in particular areas in a
municipality.
49 See Zoning and the Law of Nuisance, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 749 (1961).
50 398 I1. 202, 75 N.E.2d 355 (1947).
51 Supra note 49.
52 319 Ill. 93, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
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or at least to reduce, the congestion, disorder and danger which
often inhere in unregulated municipal development.53
The Illinois cases now give much weight to the fact that the defen-
dant's activities are permitted in the zoned area. In Patterson v. Peabody
Coal Co.,54 the defendant's coal washer had been operated in an area zoned
for industry. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant's business. The
court stated that the area had been set apart for industry by the municipal-
ity, and that even though the plaintiff had suffered an injury, industry
could not survive if every invasion of private interests were grounds for an
injunction. Since zoning attempts to provide the best use of land in the
entire municipality, this purpose ". . . . would be frustrated if private nui-
sance actions could deny to industry a place in the community in which to
operate in a reasonable manner."55
In Bauman v. Piser Undertaker Co.,56 the plaintiffs, who were residents
in the immediate area where the defendant had planned to construct a fu-
neral home, claimed that it would constitute a nuisance causing mental de-
pression and annoyance. The area where the funeral home was to be built
was zoned to permit such a use. The court denied the plaintiff's request for
an injunction and in several instances pointed to the fact that the area was
zoned for business. The court said that a funeral establishment was a lawful
and indispensable business which must be located somewhere in the city
and noted the fact that the establishment would be on an active street and
only on the edge of a predominately residential area. 57
Zoning regulations have produced an expanding effect on the law of
private nuisance, whereas the influence of nuisance law on zoning law has
been restricted. There is one area, however, where nuisance law may have
an effect on zoning law. When an area is zoned for a particular use it may
already contain uses which do not conform. These "nonconforming uses"
cannot be removed immediately unless compensation is paid. Whether or
not the law of nuisance can, in turn, be used to abate preexisting noncon-
forming uses is a possibility. 5
PRIvATE NUISANCE AND COMMERCIAL FRAUD
The facts in a nuisance case traditionally show the defendant using his
land in a manner so as to interfere with the plaintiff's peaceful enjoyment
53 Id. at 94-5, 149 N.E. at 788.
54 3 I11. App. 2d 311,122 N.E.2d 48 (4th Dist. 1954).
55 The Effect of Zoning Ordinances on the Law of Nuisances, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 266
(1955).
56 34 Ill. App. 2d 145, 180 N.E.2d 705 (1st Dist. 1962).
57 See Bieretz v. Village of Montgomery, 67 Ill. App. 2d 403, 214 N.E.2d 149 (2d
Dist. 1966), where, under similar facts, the court said that the zoning ordinance which
permitted funeral homes in the plaintiffs' area was presumed valid and that it was a
matter for the legislature as to where a funeral home should be located and not a
matter for the courts.
58 Abatement of Prior Nonconforming Uses: Nuisance Regulation and Amortization
Provisions, 31 Mo. L. Rev. 280 (1966).
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of his land. The defendant may be carrying on his business in such a way
as to emit dust, soot, noise, odors, etc.
However, the law of nuisance has been applied in situations which are
entirely different from the traditional use. It may be applied where a de-
fendant has committed a fraud on a plaintiff or has used an unfair business
practice. For example, in the Illinois case of Edelman Brothers, Inc. v. Bai-
koff,59 the court did not hesitate to apply nuisance law to a commercial
fraud. There the plaintiffs were merchants in a Chicago neighborhood who
sought to enjoin the defendants from interfering with their business. The
defendants had been standing in front of the plaintiff's stores soliciting
prospective customers away. The court granted an injunction and said that
".... where the injury resulting from the nuisance is, in its nature, irrep-
arable as . . .loss of trade . . .equity will interfere by injunction ... "60
The court further said: ".... [W]e are of the opinion that the bill states
such facts as prima facie warrants relief by injunction against a private nui-
sance being committed by defendants to the injury of complainants in their
trade or business."6'
In most of the cases where nuisance law has been applied to com-
mercial uses, the courts have discussed a public nuisance theory and not
private nuisance. 62 It would seem, however, that a private individual could
bring suit on behalf of others if he suffered special damages due to the
commercial nuisance.
The law of private nuisance may also be expanded to cases of consumer
fraud and thereby take on not only an expanded but beneficial use.
CAROLYN KRAUsE
PUBLIC NUISANCES
The term nuisance is applied to wrongs which arise when a person
uses his property unreasonably or unlawfully and his conduct annoys, in-
conveniences or injures others.' Conduct that constitutes an actionable nui-
sance maybe defined by statute,2 or may depend on the facts of each case
and not be capable of definition.3 Nuisances are classified as either public
or private. A public nuisance affects the public generally; 4 a private nui-
59 277 Ill. App. 432 (lst Dist. 1934).
60 Id. at 441.
61 Ibid.
62 See Commercial Nuisance: A Theory of Consumer Protection, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev.
590 (1966).
1 Gardner v. International Shoe Co., 319 Ill. App. 416, 49 N.E.2d 328 (4th Dist. 1943),
aff'd, 386 111. 418, 54 N.E.2d 482 (1944).
2 See generally, I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 1001/2, § 26 et seq. (1965).
3 Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co., 3 Ill. App. 2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (4th Dist. 1955).
4 Kuhn v. Illinois Cent. Ry., I1 11. App. 323 (3d Dist. 1903).
